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Noisy Signalling in Financial Markets 
Peter Bossaerts Eric Hughson 
1 Introduction
Consider the following market si tuation.  An asset wi th a future random payoff will be 
exchanged between two individuals. One has better information about the likely payoff.  
He is called the insider. The other is one among many market makers. who are prepared 
to take the opposite side of the trade for an appropriate price. The insider may be risk­
averse. Market makers are risk-neu tral. We assume that there are a sulhcient number of 
market makers for them to behave competi ti vely. The exchange operates in the following 
way. First, the insider receives a signal about the likely payoff of the risky asset. Next. 
he offers a quantity to the market makers, who react by quoting prices. Finally. exchange 
tiLkes p lace betweeu the insider iLnd the market maker who offers the rnosl favornble price.
This si tuation is reminiscent of the signalling literature (see Spence [197:3], Milgrorn and 
Roberts [1982], Cho and Kreps [1987], and others). The signalling literature. however. 
investigates non-anonymous exchange. in the sense that everything beyond the signal 
about the payoff of the risky asset is common knowledge. ln contra.st. the rnarkt>t rni­
crostructure literature has been interested in models with a greater degree of ano11nnit.1·.
The usual methods of assuring more anonymity are either lumping the insider's trades to­
gether with orders from uninformed "'noise" traders (Kyle [1985], Admati and Pfleiderer 
[1988], Fos ter and \ii;;wanathan [1990], Bernhardt and Hughson [1990]. Subrahmanyam 
[1990], etc.) or by assuming the market makers do not observe the insider's endowment 
(Glosten [1989], Madhavan [1987]). 
Unfortunately, the models o f  the market microstructure literature are highly ;;pecial­
i zed . When anonimity is introduced by aggregating informed trades wi th orders from 
noise traders, agents are assumed to be risk-neutral. In addition, orders from noise
traders, signals about security payoffs and payoffs themselves are taken to be 11on11a.U1 
distributed.1 Little guidance is provided as to how the models can be generalized, e.g., 
to the case where a.gents are risk-averse or payoffs are non-normal. The purpose of thi s
paper i s  to investigate such generalizations. 
1Subrahmanyam [1�90] has risk-averse insiders, but sets their endo1vments of the risky asset to zero. 
Consequently, insiders trade only for :;peculative reasons. This avoids the incentive corupa.tibility coudi­
tions which are at the heart of signaling games \vi th risk-averse agents. 
The market microstructure literature is complicated by the fact that part of il actually 
considers screening models, whereby the market makers move first. In Glosten and 
Ma.clhava.n's framework, the market makers quote price schedules and insiders follow by 
choosing optimal quantities along the most favorable price schedules. This is reminiscent 
of the insurance models of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1975] and Riley [1979]. Glosten 
and Madhavan have risk-averse insiders (they have negative exponential prefereuces). 
but signa.ls, payoffs and endowments continue to be normally distributed. They obtai11 
nonexistence results for low levels of noise. Our analysis will determine whether these 
results are general in the sense that they will reappear in the signalling version uf tlwi1 
model or when distributional assumptions are relaxed.2 
We start with the signalling model without anonimity. This is a straightforward ap­
plication of the existing literature on signalling models. We provide definitions for a 
Bayes-Nash as well as a Bayes-Stackelberg separating equilibrium. The reason is that it 
is possible to reinterpret Glosten and Madhavan's screening equilibrium as a sigualling 
equilibrium (where the insider, rather than the market makers, moves first) with market 
makers behaving as Stackelberg leaders. 
Although our equilibrium concepts are taken from tht> game-tlworPI ic likrat urP. uur 
market microstructure model is not a fully-specified game, since the market makers' 
strategies a.re derived from a. zero-profit constraint rather than payoff optimization. The 
zero-profit constraint is justified as the outcome of a. Bertrand competition that we do 
not model explicitly. Consequently, when we state that the market makers ··\wha,·p 
as Stackelberg leaders'', we rnean that their zero-profit constraint is solved takiug iuto 
account the insider's reaction to the solution. 
We provide three equivalent formulations of a. Ba.yes-Nash separating equilibrium. The 
first is standard. The second is taken from Ma.ila.th [1987], who shows conditions for exis­
tence and properties of equilibrium strategies such as continuity and clifferentiabilit.1·. Tlw 
third is a central planner's formulation, which both highlights the incentive COlll[Mtibility 
constraints which emerge under risk a.version and facilitates welfare analysis. 
vVhen confronting the market microstructure literature with existence resLtlts frout tire
signalling literature, a puzzle emerges. Noise, or anonimity, seems originally to have been 
introduced in market microstructure models more to assure existence than to provide a 
realistic description of financial markets. In the words of Black [1986]: "Noise makes 
financial markets possible, ... " (p. 530). In the standard signalling model. equilibrium 
exists even in the absence of noise. Confronted with this puzzle, we will iuvestigccte the 
role of noise in market microstructure models. Anticipating some results. in h:yle. etc .. 
noise enters to avoid a.utarky in a world of common posterior beliefs (see e.g. \lilgru111 
and Stokey [1982]). Heterogeneity of beliefs could substitute for noise. In Glosteu and 
Ma.dha.van's case. noise is necessary only because of the unboundedness of the signal 
::!Copeland and Galai [1983] and Glosten and Milgrom [1985] also introduce u1arket uiicro::;tructure 
inodels \vhere the n1arket inakers n1ove first. The size of the orders that can be subn1itted are constrained. 
ho\vever. 
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space: there is no "worst" type of insider. 'vVe show that introduction of bouudeduess 
through, for example, limited liability, can substitute for noise.3 From a practirnl point 
of view, this implies that dealership markets do not necessarily break clown when there
is little noise, contra.ry to what is claimed by Glosten and Madhavan. 
Subsequently, we introduce noise, not in order to guarantee equilibrium existence. but 
as a wa.y to provide anonirnity. We extend the definition of a separating Ba.yes-:'fash 
equilibrium. Intuitively, separation obtains if market makers' posterior beliefs a.bout the 
signal that insiders must have received changes as a function of the quantity offered in the 
market. We analyze in depth a case where the first moment of the posterior dist ri but iuu 
is sufficient to describe the equilibrium strategies of the market makers. The defiuitio11 
of a seperating Ba.yes-Nash equilibrium is reformulated as a genera.lization of Mailatl1s 
analysis and as the solution to a central planner's problem. Again, the latter facilitates 
computation. which is illustrated with an example. Moreover, it provides a benchmark 
to perform welfare analysis. 
The formulation of the Bayes-Nash equilibria to our model with or without norse iiS 
solutions to centra,J planner's problems indicate clearly that equilibrium strategies are 
solutions to an initial value problem. In contrast, ex-ante Pareto-efficient allocations are 
the solutions to a control problem. A comparison of the two leads to the conclusio11 t hat 
our market microstructure model does not lead to ex-ante Pareto-efficient alloca.tions. 
Allocations which are ex-ante Pareto-efficient cannot be obtained, but we illustrate how 
they can be approximated as Bayes-Nash equilibria. of a repeated version of our game. 
The empirical implications of our model a.re very different from those in the tradit ional
Ii tera.t ure. In particular. price schedules a.re generically non-linear, due to the incenti 1·e 
compatibility constraint. In addition, potential non-differentia.bilities make parametric 
estimation of the pricing function difficult. 
The pa.per is organized a.s follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing 1101sy sig1talli 11g 
models in the market microstructure literature, and investigates the role of rtoise. Sectiou 
:3 analyzes market microstructure models without noise, i.e. without anonymity. ln
section 4, we extend the concept of a separating equilibrium to signalling models with 
noise. Section 5 investigates issues of welfare and market design. Section 6 coucludes.
Lemmas and propositions are proved in the appendix. 
3This observation also applies to Kyle [1989]. 
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2 Market Microstructure Models and t he Role of
Noise. 
The purpose of this section is to briefly describe existing market microstructure l!lodels 
and to investigate the role that noise p lays in their specification. Consider, first, the 
models of Kyle [198.S], Admati and Pfleiderer [1988], Caballe and Krishnan [1990], etc. . 
where risk-neutral insiders hide their information behind noise traders. An aggregate 
quantity is announced. lumping both informed and uninformed trades. and risk-neutral. 
competitive market makers bid for i t. Informed traders and market makers have co111mo11 
priors a.nd agree on tl1e interpreta.tion of the signals the informed tra.ders might "1,Laiu.
U uinformed trades, signals and final payoffs are normally distributed. such that uuiquc 
linear equilibria exist. The role of noise seems to be small. In the absence of noise, autarky 
would obtain becaL1se o f  the marke t makers' charging absurdly high prices for any positi\'t" 
demand or absurdly low prices for any posi tive supply. Noise is not necessary to avoid 
non-existence problems ;  i t  only prevents tri vial equili bria from arising. An alternati ve to 
noise as a way to generate nontrivial equilibria would be to introduce di fferences in beliefs 
about the di stribu tion of end-of-period asse t payoffs conditional on the signal Thi s is a 
straightforward generalization o f  Morris [1990], who considers a case where traders decide 
whether to trade a predetermined quanti ty before observing prices. and hence. carn1ot 
condition on them. 
Risk-averse insiders are introduced into Kyle's environment by Subrahmanyam [ 1990]. 
There. the insider's signal i s  not observed by the specialist  but his endowmen t i s  knowu tu 
the specialist and equal to zero. Because the risk-averse insiders trade only for specula.ti ve 
reasons, incenti ve issues associated wi th risk sharing are avoided. The noise is due to 
uninformed traders, and i s  normally dis tributed, as is the signal and the final payoff. 
Without noise, autarky would obtain. 
In Glosten and Madhavan. however, risk-averse insiders face conqwtit.ive. risk-1wutral 
market makers who compete with price schedules. Noise appears in the form of a stochas­
ti c endowment, which i s  unobserved by the market makers. Insiders have expo11e11lial 
uti lity, and both signal and endowment noise are normally dis tributed. The model is set 
up as an extension o f  a continuous version of Rothschild and Stiglitz [197:)] to 1 10is_v en­
dowments. The market makers first compete wi th arbitrary price schedules, and insiders 
subsequently choose optimal quantities given the pricing function. 
Glos ten and Madhavan's results seem to indicate that a linear Nash equilibrium exists 
provided there is sufficient noise. We should contras t this with Riley's analysis. Riley 
[1979] analyzes the Nash equilibrium of the extension o f  Rothschild and Stigli tz (without 
noise) to continuous signal and payoff spaces, and shows that a Nash eq uili bri um does 
not exist. Therefore, we could interpret Glosten and Madhavan 's results as indicating 
that noise is necessary for existence in these models. However, Glosten and Madhavan 
limi t the strategy space for the market makers to that of continuous. twi ce-di ffereutia.ble 
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functions. It is an open question whether their linear equilibrium would survive com1w­
tition with discontinuous (or merely non-differentiable) price schedules. An atfinnatin' 
answer would indicate that noise is indeed necessary for continuous screening models to 
have an equilibrium. 4 
One could also view the models of Glosten and Madhavan as signalling, as opposed to 
screening models, where the insider selects a quantity before market makers competitively 
quote a price. Notice the difference: the insider observes points on the optimal price 
schedule rather than the price schedule itself. Glos ten and Madhavan 's model, theu. mu 
be interpreted as linear equilibria to this "quantity first" model where the market ma.kers 
behave as Stackelberg leaders rather than Nash (followers). Market makers deterniim' 
the optimal price c1uote given the reaction of the insiders to their strategy.
Viewiug their work as au exteusion of Kyle, it appears that Glosten aml Madha1·a.11 liaxe 
shown existence of a linear Stackelberg equilibrium provided sufficient noise is present. 
We shall confirm this shortly, after defining precisely the equilibrium concept we have 
in mind. We refrain from directly citing Glosten and Madhavan's results, since they 
do not explicitly define an equilibrium concept. They must have had in mind a Bayes 
equilibrium, as in solving for the equilibrium, they use the rules of conditional probability. 
vVhile Glosten and Ma.dhavan's results can be upheld when interpreting their tno<lel <ts 
<tn extension of Kyle, this does not imply that noise is crucial for the equilibrium tu exist. 
We shall postpone a discussion to sections 3 and 4, where Nash equilibria for tlw same
model will be investigated. The results for Nash solutions will obviously carrv over to 
Stackelberg solutions. 
We analyze the Glosten and Madhavan model as an extension of Kyle with Stackelberg 
market makers. Assume that an informed agent trades claims to a single risky asset with 
an end-of-period payoff f which is normally distributed with mean rjJ and variance 1/>2, 
and a risk free bond with price and payoff equal to one. The insider owns w units of the 
risky asset (and no bonds), where w is normally distributed with mean zero and va.riaHce
p2: w is independent of . He observes a signal a, independent of w. abocit the final
value of the risky asset. Conditional on f, a is normally distributed, with mean f aud
variance v2. Hence unconditionally, a is normally distributed with mean 6 a.He! 1·ariaHCC'
1�·2 + u2. The insider chooses to hold b bonds and offer to sell q risky assets to risk tH.'Ulr<d.
uninformed market makers. His final wealth is: W = b + (w - q)f. Given price p for the
risky asset, his budget constraint is: b + (w - q)p :S wp. The insider exhibits negative
exponential utility: u( l'V) = -�caw. He behaves Nash: given the market makers' reply
to his offer, p(·), he chooses q to maximize his expected utility. 
The assumption of negative exponential preferences is not crucial in what follows, e�cept 
when we calculate equilibria explicitly. Likewise, the normality assumptions will not be 
critical until we deal with existence. 
4Glosten [1989, p. 221] mentions that Ailsa Roell raised the same point. 
Competitive risk-neutral market makers with common beliefs quote prices p after thc-1· 
observe q .  They behave as Bertrand competitors; their equilibrium expected prohts 
conditional on q will be zero. The market makers are Stackelberg leaders. Tl1e1· do 
not directly observe the signal 17, but will infer it from q using the rules of conditional 
probability and the insider's reaction function Q(17. w; p(· ) ) .5 
Let h( 17lq, Q( 17. w; p( · ) ) )  be the conditional probability of the insider observing 17 gi ve11 
the offer q and the strategy Q(17,w;p(· ) ) ). This can be obtained from the joint density of 
( 17, w) by performing a change-of�variables to ( 17, q )  using q = Q( 17, w; p( · ) )  and computing
the conditional probability. Let n( · ) denote the normal density.
Define the mapping T from the product of the set of real-valued functions on H and H 
onto R: 
T(p(·),q) = E[flq;Q(17,w;p(·))], ( l ) 
with 
E[flq;Q(17.w:p(· ))] = j j fn(fl17 )h(17lq;Q(17.w;p(· ) ) )dfd17. (1) 
Because of the Bertrand competition, market makers will quote prices p( q )  such tha.t 
T(p(·J. q )  = p(q). We call the model M1 and its equilibrium a Bayes-Sta.ckelberg equilib­
r1u1n. 
Definition 1 A pure strategy Baye.s-Stackelberg equilibrium to M1 is a combination of 
an offer rule. Q(·.·;p(· ) ): (17,w )--+ Q(17.w;p(· ) ), and a quote rule p(· ): q--+ p(q ). such 
that: 
1. Q(17,w;p(- ) )  = argma:i•qERE[u(vV)l17, w] when W = q[p(q) - f] + wf,
2. p(q) = T(p(· ),q), where the mapping Tis given in (1).
Unfortunately, it is difficult to investigate general properties or even existence of equilib­
rium. Standard fixed-point arguments do not apply. Nevertheless, as pointed out before. 
the equilibrium calculated by Glosten and Madhavan provides a.n explicit solutiou for a 
sufficiently large amount of noise. The following proposition is a direct. co11seq U<"tlce of
the analysis in Glosten [1989] and Madhavan [ 1987]. 
Proposition 1 For p2 > f,, J\![1 has a linear Bayes-Stackelberg equilibrium . .  Vonui.,-a v 
tence obtains when p2 < _£_. - a2v4 
5If the 111arket n1akers \Vere Nash con1petitors, they would not conditiou the iusider·s st.rategy ou 
their O\Vll response, p( :). 
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3 A Model of Non-anonymous Market Making.
Consider the model in the previous section. What we mean by non-anonymou.5 market
making is that the insider's endowment is common knowledge. Unlike in Glosten and 
Madhavan, his only private information is the signal, CJ. We also drop the assumption 
that the market makers are Stackelberg leaders, and assume they play Nash. The insider 
offers a quantity q and subsequently, market makers quote prices p. The optimal resport.se
of the market makers takes as given the insider's strategy and does not contemplate l1ow 
the farmer's strategy changes as a function of the response. Thus. the model is an
extension of the standard signalling model used by Spence [197:3], Milgrom and Roberts 
[1982], and Cho and Kreps [1987], among others. The insiders attempt to signal their 
information by offering appropriate quantities. 
From the signalling literatme, it is clear that a Nash equilibrium may exist without noise. 
To see why "�11 is a signalling model, assume the signal and the final asset value can have
only two values. This, together with a lack of noise and om assumptions about the 
sequencing of events, is Rothschild and Stiglitz reversed. Here, the insider ( insuree) first 
announces a quantity (deductible) and then the market maker (insurer) quotes a price.
Equilibrium always exists (see Hellwig [1987]).6 In the absence of noise. the coutiuuous 
signal and payoff case is also a signalling model. Separating equilibria continue to exist 
as long as certain conditions are satisfied. 
More formally, define M2 as M1 with the following changes in assumptions:
1. The endowment w is commonly known and fixed at 1.
:2. The market makers play Nash.
The insider's strategy is now a function of the signal only. Q( · ) : CJ -> Q( CJ ) . The market
maker's strategy, p(·) is determined by the Bertrand competitive zero-profit co11ditio11. 
where the expectation is formed using the insider's strategy Q( · )  and Bayes' rule.7 'vVe 
focus on separating equilibria, those for which Q( · ) is invertible. Hence:
Definition 2 A separating pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibri1lm to J\112 is a combination 
of an offer rule, Q( · ) : CJ -; Q( CJ ) , and a quote rule, p( · ): q -> p( q), such that:
60ne may \Vonder about the properties of the finite signal and payoff game. VVhen there are tY..'O 
states, and many potential signals, it can be shown that equilibria which are supported by particular 
off-equilibrium path beliefs that satisfy Grossman and Perry's [1986] perfection concept ahvays exist. 
They may be separating, pooling, or partially pooling. If we generalize to more (still finite) states. 
equilibria continue to exist, and continue to be either separating, pooling, or partial pooling. 
'Unlike Stackelberg inarket inakers, Nash market makers do not consider the reaction of the insider 
to their strategy p( · ) . Hence, we need not write Q( O'; p(-) ) .
7 
1. Q(<7) = argmaxqERE[u(W)l<7,w] where W = q[p(q)-f] + wf,
:!. p(q) = E[f lQ- 1 (q)].
provided the inverse Q-1 ( · ) e:rists.
This equilibrium could also be called perfect as long as each interval in the image space
of Q( · ) occurs with positive proba.bility. Unlike in the finite signal and payoff game. 
equilibria which satisfy definition 2 and span the image space of Q( ·) are robust to 
standard refinements. 
We work with two equivalent formulations of the above equilibrium notion. The first is
due to Ma.ila.th [1987]. Notice that the market makers' strategies are mechanical: given
a.n announced quantity q, they determine the signal & that generates the propm;al by 
inverting what they perceive the insider's strategy to be. Then, from&, they detennine 
p(q). One could a.s well limit the market makers' actions to the announcement of a.
signal they believe to have generated the offer. Prices a.re then calculated by setting
p(&) = E[fl&J. Consequently, we can rewrite the insider's optirnizatio11 probleni as: 
where 
maxqER U(<7, &, q),
U(<7,&,q) = E[u(W) j<7] ,
W = q[p(&) - f] + w f,
p(&) = E[fl&J. 
( )) 
The optimand to be maximized by choice of q is the utility of the insider given he 
receives signal <7, offers quantity q, and the market maker infers signal &. We uow show
the following equivalence: 
Lemma 1 Q(·): O" -> Q(<7), is a separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy fiH an
insider in lv/2 if and only if Q( ·) is invertible, with inverse Q-1 ( ·), and satisfies T( Q ( ·). <7)
= Q( <7), where the mapping T is defined by: 
T(Q(·),<7) = argmaxqERU(<7,Q-1(q),q).
Ma.ila.th provides sufficient conditions on U (. , ·, ·) for a separating eq uili bri urn to ( l) tu
exist and to be continuously differentiable. Unfortunately, exponential utility, together 
with normally distributed signals, a.re not sufficient for existence, as we will subsequently
show. 
The separating Ba.yes-Na.sh equilibrium can also be found by solving a. central planner's 
problem (see Ma.skin and Tirole [1990] and La.ffont and Tirole [1990]). This facilitates
8 
both the computation of equilibrium strategies, and the welfare analysis (which is cunsid­
ered in section .S ) . The criterion functional in the central planner's problem is an in Legra!
defined with respect to some probability measure µ. That is, the expected utility of the
different types of insiders (each type receives a different signal) is weighted by µ . First.
the central planner announces an allocation rule. Then the insider announces a signal. 
In setting the allocation rule, the central planner ensures truthful revelation of the signal. 
Lemma 2 Let Y be the set of invertible real-valued functions on the signal space . Cj( · ) :  
O" __, Q (  O"), zs a separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy for the insidu in J11 1/ and
only if: 
Q (·) = argmaxy(·JU j U(O", O", y (O") ) dµ (O")
s.t. U(O", O", y (u) )  2: U(0",0-,y (O-) ) \f (]",(]", 
for some probability measure µ de.fi.ned on the signal space. 
The incentive compatibility constraint in the planner's problem states that. given alloca­
tion rule y(  ·), truthfully revealing O" maximizes the insider's utility. Thus. this forniula.t iutt
highlights that when extending Kyle's market microstructure model to risk-axerse insid­
ers, risk sharing becomes an issue and consequently, an incentive compatibility condition 
is necessary. 
If the equilibrium Q( · ) to M2 is continuously differentiable, (5) can be rewritten as:
Q(·) = argmaxy()EY j U(O", O", y (O") )d!i(O" )
s.t .  d� U(O", 0-, y (O-) ) la=a = 0.
( 6) 
(7) 
provided that the second order conditions of the insider's problem, lvl a.raU ( O", 0-. y( 0-) ) , 
are satisfied at O" = 0-. The constraint (7) is the first order condition to this rna.ximiza.tion
problem, which is just a restatement of the incentive compatibility constraint. (7) can 
be rewritten a.s: 
I U2 (0", 0", y ) !J = - , U3( O", O", y) 
(8) 
where Uj is the first derivative of U with respect to the j'h argument. Consequently. the
solution to the planner's problem is a solution to an initial value problem.8 'vVe solve 
(8) and pick the solution which maximizes (6) , provided it satisfies the seco11d order 
conditions. 
The planner's problem can be simplified by setting µ(  ·) = .50( · ) , a probability measure
that puts all mass on O" = 0. Let Y = {y ( · ) l y ( · )  .solves (8)). Then . y(· ) E V solves
8Niailath also sho\vs that Nash equilibria to signalling games can be found by solving an ordinary 
differential equation. 
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the central planner's problem if y(O) = argmax,U(O, 0, z) provided it also satishes the
second order conditions. 
To show that 1'112 has a separating Bayes-Nash solution, we would like to use tlw repre­
sentation in lemma 2 and appeal to Mailath. Unfortunately, Mailath provides sufficieut 
conditions for existence only for compact signal spaces, whereas the signal space in our 
example, and indeed, in the market microstructure literature in genera.I , is the real line. 
Consequently, we require a different proof. It is sufficient to show that the central plan­
ner's problem has a solution that satisfies the second order condition of the incenti u� 
compatibility constraint. U nfortunately, it does not. 
Proposition 2 There does not e.�ist a separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M2. 
In brief, the reasoning behind this proposition is as follows. Set the central planner\ 
weighting function, fl(·), equal to a probability distribution with full mass on a particu­
lar Ct. Then there will exist a signal below Ct such that if the insider receives that signal,
the second order conditions of his incentive compatibility constraint are not satisfied. 
Furthermore, weighting functions that put full mass on a particular value of the signal 
essentially capture all possible weighting functions. We refer to the a.ppendix for a de­
tailed proof. Consequently, the problem with J1;fz is the unbounded signal space. Once
we bound the signal space from below, so there is a worst signal. existence follows. 
For example, change 1W2 to a model 111� as follows. Let the signal be defined on [O, OG ) . 
and let the value of the asset f, conditional on a, be normally distributed with mean 
u' , w' cl . u'w' f 2 cl 2 ( h' h l l . v2+ip21> + v2+iP2 a an var1a11ce v2+'t/;2 or some constants v an 'ljJ w ic ose t 1e1r
meaning from model lvl2 ) .  Drop the other assumptions about the distributions of a and 
f. We can now show the following:
Proposition 3 There exists a separating non-linear Bayes-Nash equilibri'llm to .VJ�. wtlh 
Q( · ) solving: 
av2 ln IQI - av2Q + av2 + a= 0 
Note that Q is a non-linear function of a. The non-linearity is clue to the incentive
compatibility constraint. This implies that the price schedule, p( · ) , is also non- linear.
We have: 
Corollary 1 p(q) = "'�f'ef> + u,'�2f2av2[q - 1 - log lq l] , 
d2p(q) - ij;2 av2 > 0 Jq2 - v2+1/i2 --q'1 · 
dp(q) 
dq 
•v' ''[l l ] () 
-,+ ,a1 - -1  < . u Ii-'- 'I 
That is, the pricing function is decreasing in the quantity offered at a decreasing rate. 
Notice that only the insider with the worst signal (a = 0) is able to fully insure himself.
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Due to the incentive compatibility constraints, insiders with better signals do not wish
to sell the entire endowment. 
4 A Model of Anonymous Market Making.
In the previous section. we investigated NJ,, where risk-averse insiders with known endow­
ments trade with risk-neutral market makers. This was an application of the standard 
signalling model, and results such as existence of a non-linear equilibriurn obtain. pro­
vided the signal space is bounded from below. 
That model was one of non-anonymous market ma.king: the market makers know the 
endowments of the insiders. While this considerably simplifies the analysis, it is not a 
reasonable assumption in a.ll environments. vVe re-introduce noise not to obtain existence 
of equilibrium, since equilibrium exists in the absence of noise. but instead to cnha11ce 
realism. 
\Ve continue to work with our example, which we extend to allow for ullknown en<low­
ments. We shall elaborate where the a.nalysis can be generalized. C'onsi<ler "12, but
assume in addition tha.t. a.s in section 2. w. the endowment. is normally distri buted. with
mean zero and variance p2 Insiders know w; the market makers do not. Call this model
M3· 
There is an immediate problem. We are interested in separating equilibria. but the 
strategy of the insider now becomes a function of both a and w. Q ( . , · ) . This functiou
cannot be invertible in a without knowledge of w.9 Therefore, the definition of separation
must be extended to cover 1V13. Intuitively, separation means that the market makers· 
assessment of the likely signal ( and hence. the price that they quote ) .  t11ust chauge wi tl1 
the quantity offered. Since we are interested in Bayes-Nash equilibria. we require t liat
the market makers use Bayes' rule to form a. posterior for the signal given the quantity 
offered. A natural extension of the definition is that separation obtains if this posterior 
changes with the quantity. 
When the market makers are risk-neutral and the final values given the signals are nor­
mally distributed, we do not need the complete posterior distribution of a give11 q. which
in general is difficult to compute. In our example, we need only compute the mean of 
the conditional distribution: 
p(q) £[.fjq;Q(-,·)].
9The insider could still con1municate both his signal and his endowment by coding his n1essage '!· The 
inarket n1akers \vould decode the announced quantity and charge a price accordingly. In 'vhat follo\v:; \Ve 
assu1ne that the market inakers cannot perfectly invert the quantity for the signal and the endo,vn1ent. 
Actually, it is not clear that the insider wants such perfect decoding to take place, and, if he does, hoi,.v 
he could co1n1nunicate the key to his code. 
1 1  
v2 
·2 ·z<I' +v + 1/-' 
where the conditional distribution of a given q i s  determined by (:2), using a. chauge-of­
variables a.nd conditioning. 
Our analysis extends to the more general case of risk-averse market makers ur noll­
normal signals. It i s  considerably messier, because the complete conditional distribution 
of a given q needs to be known in order for the market makers to compute the compet­
itive price. We believe that our example, which is the canonical example in the market 
microstructure literature, captures most of the important features of the general case. 
Now, separation can be defined with respect to the conditional mean of O" gi veu q. Tliis 
will replace Q-1( ·) in the definition of a separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium given ill
section :3. 
Definition 3 A separating pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M3 is a combination 
of quantity offers Q( ·. · ) : ( O", w) -> Q( a, w), and price quotes p( ·): q -> p( q). such that:
1. Q( O", w) = argmax,ER E[u( l-Ji) la, w] where W = q[p( q) - f) + w f,
2. p(q) = "'�,p2d.>+ v'�20,E[O"lq;Q(.,·)], 
'J. E[alq; Q(·, ·)] # E[alq; Q(·, ·)], liq# q. 
As in the previous section, we consider two alternative formulations of the equilibrium. 
The first is an extension of Mailath to unknown endowments. The second is a central 
planner's problem. 
While the former is straightforward, the latter is considerably more difficult. There. the 
insider is asked to reveal his information. He might have an incentiw· to n1isrepn'"'11I
that information and announce a different signal from the one he recei ves. The ce11tra.l 
planner's problem is to find an allocation rule (quantities and prices ) which ma.ximizes 
the insider's utility subject to a truth-telling constraint. Because of the noise, the central 
planner can insist only that combinations of the unknown variables (s ignal and endow­
ment ) be revealed truthfully. Since he can allocate only one asset, he cannot enforce 
truthful revelation of the signal and endowment separately. He can only ensure truthful 
revelation of a variable z = Z(o-, w). That is, all insiders that have signals and e11-
dowments which generate some z announce this truthfully in a separating equilibriurn. 
Consequently, for the purpose of translating our Bayes-Nash equilibrium into the equiv­
alent of Mailath's formulation or into a central planner's problem. we focus 011 equilibria 
which reveal particular combinations of the signal and endowment, z = Z(o-. w), where
Z(  ·, ·) is invertible in w for all a. 
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Definition 4 .4 separating pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M0 that !'furnls : = 
Z( a. w) is a combination of a quantity offer Q( ·, · ) : (a, w) __, Q( a, w). and a priu quoit., 
p( ·): q __, p( q), such that:
1. Q( a, w) = m gma:uqER E[u( W) la, wl where W = q[p( q) - fl + w f.
' Q(a, w) = Q(Z(a, w)), Q(·) is invertible, with inverse Q-1(·). Z(·, ·) is inutrliblt 
in w for all a, with inverse z-1( ·, . ),
This leads to the equivalent of Mailath's formulation. Let a denote the conditional mean
of a that the market makers infer from q. The insider's problem is:
where: 
maxqER U( a, w, a, q) 
U(a, w, 0-, q) = E[u(W)ja, w],
vV = q[p(a) - fl+ wf.
A v 
2 ,' 1£12 A p( a) = GD + a v2 + 1/J2 ' v2 + 4•2 
'
(9) 
Now the optimand to be maximized by choice of q is the utility of the insider given he
receives signal a. has endowment w, offers quantity q, and the market maker infers a. 
Lemma 3 Q( ·, ·): (a, w) __, Q( a, w ), is a separating Bayes-Nash equilib1·ium strategy 
for the insider to !1!/3 that reveals : = Z(a, w), where Z( ·, · )  is invertible In ll' jlH all
a, if and only if Q(a,w) = Q(Z(a,w)), where Q(·) is invertible, with inverse (J-'(·). 
and Z ( ·, · ) is invertible in w for all a,  with inverse z-1 ( ·, ·), and Q( ·) and Z ( ·. ·) .oalisfi;: 
T(Q(·),Z(·,·),a,w) = Q(a,w), where the mapping T is defined by: 
� �-1 -1 T(Q(-),Z(·,·),a,w) = argmaxqER U(a,w,E[alQ (q);Z ( · , · ) ] , q ) . (10) 
We could proceed as in  Mailath and provide sufficient conditions on U(·, ·, ·, · ) for the 
solution to (10) to exist and be continuously differentiable. We shall delegate this to 
future research. Rather, we will work with the alternative formulation and show existence 
for our particular example lvh. The equivalent central planner's problem is:
Lemma 4 Q( ·, ·): ( <7, w) __, Q( a, w), is a separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium strattyy for 
the insider in lvh that reveals z = Z (a, w), where Z ( ·, ·) is invertible in w for all a. if 
and only if Q(a, w) = Q(Z(a,w)). where 
1. Z( ·, · ) is invertible in w for all 17, with inverse z-1 ( ·, ·), such that
U(17, z-1(l7,z),£[17lz; z-1(·, ·)],y(z)) 
..::: U(17, z-1(17,z),£[17lz; z-1(-, ·)],y(i)) ( 11) 
has a single invertible solution y(-) for all z, 17, and 
J. Q( · ) solves:
Q(·) = argma1'y()El j U(17,Z-1(17.z),£[17lz;Z-1(-,·)],y(z))dµ(l7,z).
for some probability measure /l( 17, z) defined on the product of the signal spa.ff and
the endowment space. Y is the set of functions that solve ( 11). 
The central planner's formulation of the equilibrium allocation makes clear how 2(17. w) 
can be chosen. The choice must be such that (11), the incentive compatibility condition. 
has a. solution y( · ) . Provided the second order condition is satisfied, we can write the
incentive compatibility condition as a differential equation: 
y' = (12) 
where Uj i s  the first derivative of U with respect to the j'h argument. '.\ot,ice the restric­
tion that (12) puts on Z(·,·). z-1(·,·) must be such that the right hand side does not 
depend on 17, since the left hand side does not. In M3, this would be satisfied by:
Lemma 5 If Z(17. w) = 17 - av2w, then the right hand side of ( 12) does not depend on
17. 




From lemma. 5 we can show: 
1/-•2 + 02
i/>(l- ,1,2+ 2+ 2 4 2
),Y v a v  p 
l/J2 + v2
I l :i) 
Proposition 4 If p2 > '":,��', there exists a linear separating Bayes-Nash eq·uilibriurn lo
1\13 that reveals z = 17 - av2w, namely:
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p(q) = v2 IJ)
2 lo av2 
2 2 <P + 2 + 2 ho+ ;i
(-1-- + ·J 1 q) ).u + l)J v v· - ;1 -11 -
Notice that i f  v2-.. (XO, then 11 -.. 0,  and hence, Q(u, w )  = Q(z(u, w ) )  = w :  The insider is
perfectly insured. Also, more noise i s  required for the existence of the linear equilibrium 
than in the Stackelberg case ( cf. Proposition 1 ). For equilibrium to exist, 'fl must be
less than 1 · As '/1 T �, the specialist is increasingly able to distinguish amongst signals.
Hence, his reaction to observing a large quantity is to decrease the price by an increa.sing 
amount. At 11 = �, his reaction is infinite, and markets break down.10
P • • D 2 < iJ;2+v2 ropos1t10n 5 ro1· p -;;2,;4 , a Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M3 that l'eveals z 
av2tu does riot e:z:ist. 
The reason for this negative result is clear. Because the signal and the endowment are 
normally distributed, z is unbounded, and there is no worst type. A11y strategy oue 
could propose that satisfies the second order conditions of the incentive col!lpatibilit.v 
constraint for types z > z is suboptimal for some type below i, i11 the se11se that i t
violates his  second order conditions. 
Consequently, an equilibrium fails to exist for exactly the same reason that it failed to 
exist in the exponential-normal model without noise, M�2. Indeed, it is the very reason
that Glosten obtains non-existence for insufficent noise in  his model. To recover existence, 
it is necessary to bound the types z from below. Since z = u - av2w, this implies that
the signal and the endowment should both be defined on a compact set.
As an example, consider the following changes to the assumptions of "'1:3. 
1. u i s  uniformly distributed on [O, l] .
2. w is uniformly distributed on [O, l] .
:3. J conditional on u is normally distributed with mean u'��2 <P+ ,.2�1u2 u and variance
-u2 w2 
u2+tJi2 · 
Call this model Nf�. Then: 
Proposition 6 .4 linear Bayes-Nash equilibrium. to M� that reveals z = u - ar2u· dot.' 
not e'"ist. 
10It is puzzling that the criterion function in the central planner's problem plays no role. It does not 
even determine the initial condition for the differential equation as in section 3. Given sufficient noise. 
there is a unique, linear solution to the central planner's incentive compatibility constraint. 
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Proposition 7 For v2 < �, there exists a non-linear Bayes-Nash equilib1·ium to .II'. that
reveals z = a - a·v21u. 
Existence can also be shown for values of v2 above l _ a 
While the equilibrium solution does not have a closed form, we can calculate i t  nu­
merically. Figure 1 provides an example for particular parameter values. Notice the 
non-clifferentiabilities in Q(- ) , which arise clue to the compactness of the signal and en­
dowment space and the fact that the equilibrium reveals only combination.> of tlw signal 
a.ncl the endowment. These non-clifferentiabilities carry over to the market rna.ker< prici11g 
function. Since E [o-1 z :  z-1 ( · ,  · )] is increasing in z, the pricing function is also clown ward 
sloping. 
An interesting question is whether the a.bove equilibrium converges to tha.t derived iu 
section 3 where there is no noise ( model lvf;) .  To answer this question, define a sequeuce of
models p1;0}, indexed by [J. identical to lVI� except tha.t 10, the endowment, is uniformly
distributed on [ (1- 8), l]. 
Proposition 8 For v2 < �, the non-linear Bayes-Nash eq·uihbrium lo :H�, co11.1.'t rye.> lo
that of lVI� as 8 l 0.
Figure 2 illustrates the convergence for particular parameter values. 'fotice that this 
implies that equilib·1·ium exists, regardless of the amount of noise. Thus Glosten 's claim 
tha.t a. monopolist specialist is required to keep markets open if there is insufficient noise 
depends critically on the unboundedness of the signal and endowment spaces. This is 
also true for Maclhavan's cla.im about the necessity of batch markets. 
5 Welfare Aspects and Market Design
Now we turn to the issue of market design. Is our market setup optima.]? If not. what 
changes need to be ma.de for it to be optima.I? What we mean by optimality is Pa.reto­
efficiency, when allocations a.re generated by a benevolent central planner who ma.ximi�es 
some welfare criterion ( weighted average utility ) .  In our environment, the best we ca.n 
hope for is constrained Pareto-efficiency, where the central planner faces an information 
constraint. In  pa.rticula.r, she does not observe the insider's signal, a.nd therefore must 
provide insiders the right incentive to truthfully reveal the signal and a.Hocate resources 
a.ccorclingly.
vVe focus on the no-noise environment. Here, we determine the optima.I allocation rule in  
a. situation where a.n informed, risk-a.verse insider wishes to  share risk with risk-neutral
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uninformed market makers, who know the endowment of the insider. Tlw allocatiu11 ru[,� 
can be written as a pair of functions of the report of the insider, er, { q( ·), p( ·)). where q 
is the quantity the central planner takes from the insider, and pis the price she charges
the market maker. 
We examine the social welfare functions which put zero weight on the market maker's 
utility. This corresponds to assuming the market makers a.re competitive and on average. 
their profits equal zero. We also must put weights on the insider's utility function for 
each possible signal u. 'vVe take v( · ) , the prior probability of observing u. This will cusurc
that the allocation rule { q (  · ) , p( ·)} (now functions of u, assuming truthful reporting) is
ex-ante Pareto-efficient (efficient from the point of view of the insider be(ore he obsen·es 
the signal ) .  
Let V(u, q(u) , p(u ) )  = E[u(W)lu] where W = q (<7) [p(u) - f] + wf. 
Definition 5 The allocation rule { q( · ), p( · )}  is ex-ante Pareto-efficient if it is the .>olu­
tion to: 
{ q (·),p( · )} = argmaxy( ),.c( )EY j V(u, y(u), x(u))dv(<7) ( l-±) 
s.t. \/(u,y(u) , :r (u)) :'.'.: \/(u, y (er), :z: (er) ) 'Ver, ( l)) 
j(x(u) - E[flu] )dv(<7) = 0, ( 16) 
where Y is the set of real-valued functions defined on the signal space. 
(15)  is the incentive compatibility constraint, and ( 16) is the market makers· zero prnht 
constraint. 
The central planner's problem can be written as a control problem with u playing the
role of time. Unlike the central planner's problems of sections :3 and 4, the criterion 
function now plays a role beyond providing initial conditions for the corresponding dif­
ferential equation. The difference· emerges because the pricing rule p( · ) is no longer a 
predetermined function, but could be any of a family of functions which satisfy ( 16). 
It is clear that the separating Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M� will often be different from
the Pareto-efficient solution. That is, the Pareto-efficient allocation cannot alwa.ys be 
implemented as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium to M�.'1 The question is, how can we design a
11 Examples may be constructed based on Pontryagin's ma..ximum principle. 
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market which does generate Pareto-efficient allocations? There is an easy way to proceed: 
We can embed our one-period model in a repeated framework. and appea.I to folk-theorelll 
like arguments. 
Let the game i\l � be repeated identically for time t = 1, . . .  , = · One insider can choose
each period from among a countably infinite number of market makers. Once he lrns 
made his choice, he pays a fee t to the market maker for the right to trade with her over 
the next period. Then he observes his signal, announces a quantity, and she charges him 
a price. The following period, the insider can opt to either switch market makers, or stcty
with the same one. 
In order to keep the market maker from exploiting her temporary monopoly position. 
the insider pays a fee t each period such that the discounted value for the market tllctker 
from keeping the insider as a customer forever (if 6 is the discount rate. this valut' is ,�  .. )
marginally exceeds her one-period monopoly profit plus the one-period fee E.
Consequently, the insider can make the market maker behave as in the Pareto central 
planner's problem. It is not in the latter's interest to deviate, because she would lose a 
customer, making zero profits from period t + 1 on, as opposed to 1�8 . Notice that the
Pareto-efficient allocation can only be approximated: the insider must pay a fee t each 
period. This fee, however, will be small if the discount rate 6 is high.
Were there more than one insider, the fee would be bigger because the market maker 
faces a positive probability of another insider contacting her after the former customer 
has departed due to her price gouging. Now the discounted sum of fees must exceed the 
sum of ( i )  the one-period monopoly profits, ( i i ) the one-period fee E .  ( i i i )  the expected 
profits from future customers who might contact her. Note that if all insiders obser1!f 
price gouging, this situation reduces to the single insider case. 
6 Conclusion 
Our analysis of noisy signalling models has important implications for empirical analysis 
of market microstructure models. First, as in signalling models with no noise. the incen­
tive compatibility constraints for the risk-averse traders lead to non-linearities in the equi­
librium price-quantity schedules. Second, since the equilibrium will reveal only combina­
tions of several random variables, each defined on a compact set, non-differentiabilities 
might appear in the price schedule. Both properties complicate empirical analysis of the 
price impact of trade. Nonparametric estimation seems advisable. especially since the 
shape and location of the non-differentiabilities of the equilibrium price schedule depend 
on relatively arbitrary assumptions. 
Non-linearities and non-differentiabilities might explain why in empirical studies of the 
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traditional linear model, the slope coefficient of the price-quantity schedule. i .e .  the 
price impact parameter, i s  often economically insignificant (see e.g. Glosten and Harris 
[1989], Hughson and Bernhardt [1990], etc. ) .  Figure 2 illustrates how, as the amount
of noise increases (.5 r 1), the equilibrium quantity-signal combinatio11 schedule. and
hence the price-quantity schedule, has increasingly steeper edges and a flatter interior. 
Consequently, we conjecture that the common stock of firms held by a limited number of 
well known insiders, because of the absence of noise, will exhibit a strong price impact of 
trade. Conversely. common stock of firms held by a dispersed group of insiders. because 
of the greater noise, will show relatively little price impact. 
In this paper we have assumed that market makers are risk-neutral. If market makers are 
risk-averse, the situation is more complicated. In particular, inventory considerations can 
no longer be ignored ( see also Biais and Hillion [1991] ) .  We speculate that the following
framework might lead to more precise conclusions. Consider a large number of risk-averse 
market makers. Each of them will have a different reservation value for the risky asset 
because of differences in inventory. Hence, their bidding for the quantity offered by an 
insider is reminiscent of first-price auctions. If there are enough market nrnkers. each 
will bid her reservation value ( as opposed to a value strictly below the reservation rnlue ) .  
The model might become especially intriguing if put in a repeated framework. Among 
other things, it seems that transaction prices might fail to be autocorrelated. despite 
inventory issues, and contrary to a widely cited presumption. vVe leave the verification 
of this conjecture to future research. 
Finally, a comment regarding the static nature of our model is warranted. Even the 
repeated version lacks genuine dynamics. It is not clear what results would emerge 
when allowing the insider to trade at various times before all uncertainty is  resolved. 
Kyle analyzes this problem for a risk- neutral insider. Our insider is risk-averse. and 
consequently, does not trade merely for speculative reasons, but also to share risk. lri 
addition to the multi period incentive compatibility problems this raises, recontractiug 





Q(a)  = argrnax,ERE[u( W) la] 
where l,V = q(p( q )  - f) + wf
p(q )  = £[f lQ-1 (q )] 
8 Q(a)  argmaxqERU(a, &, q )  
where & = Q-l ( q )
8 Q(a)  argmax,ERU(a, Q-1 ( q ) ,  q ) ,  
where Q(a)=argma:cqERU(a, Q-1 ( q ) , q )  i s  shorthand notation for: Q( a ) = T ( Q ( · ) , a ) .  
where the mapping T is defined by T(Q ( · ) , a) = argrnaxqERU(a, Q- 1 ( q ) , q ) . • 
To prove lemmas 2 and 4, we first show the following equivalPnce:
Lemma 6 x( ·). a .function fl'Om R to R.  is invertible. with inverse .r-1 ( · ) . and satisfies
T(:i: (·),IJ) = x(IJ ) .  where the mapping T is defined by T( x ( · ) , IJ )  = argma:r,ERf( l) , x - 1 ( z ) ,  z ) , 
if and only 1fx( ·) = argma:rz( )El J f(IJ, IJ, z (IJ ) )dµ(IJ ) ,  s. t. VIJ, B : f(IJ, IJ , z ( IJ ) )  2: f(B, O, z ( iJ) ) ,  
for some probability measure µ( IJ ) . Y is the set of invertible real-valued junctions on R .
Proof: vVe use shorthand notation. First, x (IJ) = argmaxzERf(O . :r- 1 ( z ) . z )  if  .t ( · ) .  a 
function from R to R,  is invertible, with in  verse x- 1  ( · ) , and satisfies 1 ' (  �·( · ) . I) )  = .c( ti ) .
where the mapping T is defined by T(x( · ) , IJ )  = argmax,ERf( e . .r-1 ( z ) . z ) . Secuml. ti E 
argrnaxeERf(B , B ,  z (B ) )  if VIJ, B: f(IJ, IJ, z (IJ ) )  :::: f(O, e, z (B ) ) .
( =? )  
(i) x (IJ )  = argmax,ER.f(O, :c- 1 ( z ) , z )  =? 
x(B )  = argrnaxzERf(B, IJ, z ) =? 
(ii) 
x (O )  = argrnaxz(·)EY J f(B, 0, z(IJ ) ) dµ (O ) ,  all µ(O ) .
x (B )  = argmax,ERf(O, x-1 ( z ) , z ) .  
Hence, max,ER f ( /) ,  x- 1 ( z ) . z )  = maxBER .f(  IJ,  x-1 ( x(  B ) ) .  x (  B ) )  = rnaxBER f ( I) .  iJ . .  l' ( iJ ) ) .  
Hence, () =  argmax0ER.f(O , O , z (B ) ) ,  with z ( - )  = x ( · ) . 
( <¢=) (By contradiction) Assume, for some µ( B ) ,
x ( · ) = argmaxz( )EY j f(IJ, IJ, z (O ) ) dµ(O )
s . t .  e = argmaxBERf(B, B. z(O) ) ,  
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and \i x ( · ) invertible: argmaxzERf((), x- 1 ( z ) , z ) = z'(()) # x(() ) ,  some IJ ( i .e .  x-1 ( z " )  # IJ.
some z• ) . Let Z be the set of  functions z (  · )  that satisfy: () E argma» BER! ( (). iJ .  z ( I) ) ) .  for 
all e.  We must verify whether :r( · )  is an element of Z. If not, it cannot possiblv soh·e 
argmaxz( ·) EY  j f(· , (), z ( () ) )dµ(())
s . t .  () = argma:rBERJ(B. B , z(B ) ) .  
For any invertible :r ( · ) : maxBER J (B , B, x (B ) )  = maxiER f(B, x- 1 ( .i ) , :r{:r- 1 ( :' ) ) ) . Coust'· 
quently, for argma:tBERf((), iJ , x(B) )  = () for all 11, it must be that:
Yet, for some B, argm.a:r;ER f(O, .r- 1 (z ) ,  z )  = z' (O ) # :r (() ) , for some 0.  Hence, .c( · )  rt Z .
• 
Proof: ( Lemma 2) Follows directly from lemmas l and 6. • 
Proof: ( Proposition 2) We solve the central planner's problem setting w = l. 
U(u. IT, y (& ) )
1
p( & )y (& ) + ( 1 - y(&) )E[flu] - 2a(l - y(IT) )2var(flu ) 
• l/J2 • ( v
2 11'2 ) 
l 
( ) ) ' 
u ' lf.!'
y(u) v2 + ,µ2
(u - u) + v2 + ,µ2 ¢ 
+ 
v2 + .,µ2 0"  - 2
a(l - y u - , ,2  + u' ·
Consequently, y( · ) has to solve:
I y y = -. av2( 1- y )
All solutions to this ( separable) ordinary differential equation can be written as: 
( 1 7 )  
for constants k .  To determine k ,  set µ (u )  = 80 (u ) ,  a probability distribution with Lrnit
mass at u = 0-. It follows that y (i7 )  = 1 and k = -a-.  This satisfies the second-order
conditions for u = a- . To see this, notice that the second-order conditions are:
d�2 U(u, &,
y (& ) ) la=a < 0, i .e. y'(u )  < 0.
Since y (i7 )  = 1, lim0 i0y' (u )  = - oo ,  limal" dd:, U(u, &, y(& ) ) la=a = - oo ,  and the secoud­
order conditions hold. However, take any u ::;  i7 - av2 . From ( 17 ) ,  y (u )  must satisfy:
ye-y > 1, i .e . ,  y (u )  > 1. But then y'(a) > 0, violating the second-order conditions.
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What about other probability distributions that can be used in the criterion function of 
the central planner? We have only used µ(er ) = b,, ( er ) . Any other distribution. however. 
will pick a strategy determined by a particular k. Such a strategy already t llrned out
to be optimal for i7 = -k , i .e . . µ (er) = b_k( er ) . Hence, we have essentially a.nalyzed all
possible distributions µ(a) . II 
Proof: ( P roposition :3 ) Use the formulation of the equilibrium as a. centrnl planner's 
problem. As in the proof of proposition 2, the following equation solves the ordinary
differential equation that provides the first-order condition for the incentive compatibility 
co11stra.int: ') ') 2 av-ln l y l  - av-y + av + a +  k = 0. i lC: i 
Set 1i (a )  = 60(a )  to determine k. It  follows that y(O)  = 1 and k = U .  This pa.rt icular
solution satisfies the second-order condition for all a 2 0. To see this. notice that. from
( 18 ) .  y ha.;; to satis(y:
Since ye-y is continuous on [O, l] and reaches a maximum of e-1 and a minimum of 0,
whereas e-1e- •�2 is between 0 and e-1 for a 2: 0, y (a )  will be somewhere between 0
and 1 .  Consequently, 
1
���) > 0 and y'(a )  > 0, which is required for the second-order
conditions to be satisfied. II 
Proof: ( Lemma. 3 )  
Q(  a. w )  argmaxqERE ( u ( \;\! ) la, z- l ( · . · )]
where W = q[p(q )  - f] + wf 
02 . ip2 _ p( q ) = v2 + ,p2 <P + v2 + ,p2 E [a lQ-1(q ) : z-1 ( · . · ) ]
where Q(Z(a, w ) )  = Q(er, w) 
<=:- Q(a, w )  argmaxqeRU(er, w,  &, q )  
where & = E[a lQ-1 (q ) ;  z-1 ( · ,  - )] 
with Q(Z(a, w) )  = Q(a, w )  
<=} Q( er, w)  argmaxqERU( a, w, E[a lQ-1 ( q ) : z-1 ( " .  ) ]  . q )
with Q(Z(a, w)) = Q(a, w) ,  
where Q(  er, w )=argmaxqERU( a,  w, E[er lQ-1 (  q ) ; z-1 ( " .  ) ] , q )  i s  shorthand notation for:
Q(a, w )  = T(Q( · ) , Z( - , · ) , a, w) ,
where the mapping T is defined by
T(Q( - ) ,  Z ( - ,  · ) , a, w) = argmaxqeRU(a, w, E[alQ-1 ( q ) ;  z- 1 (  . . · )] , q ) . 
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II 
Proof: ( Lemma 4 )  Follows from lemmas 3 and 6.  (Instead of a single "objective"
argument, 17, we now have two "objective'' arguments; 17 and w. z - 1 ( 17. z )  s u bst i t utes
for the latter . )  • 
Proof: ( Lemma .) )
Hence: 
In order for -�; dd0 £[17 l z; z- 1 ( . ,  · ) ] to be independent of 17 ,  we need
2 ' 2 ' 2 1fJ - 1  v 1fJ 
v 2  + 7jJ2
17 + aZ ( 17, z ) v2 + 7jJ2 
to be independent of 17. To obtain this result, let Z(i7, w )  
z - 1 ( 17 z )  == -1-17 - -1- z . Independence of 17 follows since:' av2 av2 
v2 + 7jJ2 z.
17 - m· 2w .  Therefore. 
• 
Pmof: (Proposition 4) Use the central planner's formulation of the Bayes-Nash equi-
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librium. Solve the first-order conditions to the incentive compatibility constraint ( '111 
ordinary differential equation ) :  
d
U3(0", z-1 (0", z ) , E[O"lz; z- 1 ( · .  · )J , y ( .Z ) )  · dz E[O" l z; z-1 ( · . · l l
+ [4 ( O". z-1  ( (]". z ) '  E [(]" I z; z-1 ( . , . ) ] ,  y ( z) )y' ( z )  I i=z = 0'
i .e . :
- av'y'y + y'(-yo + h1 - l )z)  + l1 Y = 0.
The following provides a ( unique) linear solution:
lo( 1 - 2-ii ) 2-11 - 1 y ( z ) = + z .  
av2 ( 1  - 'li l av2
The second-order conditions are: 
d 
dz E [(]"I z; z-1  ( . ,  · )  J 
+ u4 ( (]", z-1 ( O", z J ,  E [ (]" 1 .z; z-1  ( . ,  . J] , y ( .z l l .
Rearranging yields, 
y'( i ) ) lz=z < 0. 
211 - 1--, - < 0. 
av 
For the second-order conditions to hold, it must be that 11 < �. or:
' p > �
,2 + 02 
a2v4 . 
• 
Proof: (Proposition .5) From the proof of proposition 4, it follows that the second-order 
conditions are violated for 11 > �' i .e. ,  for p2 ::; '":,�:' . • 
We prove proposition 7 before proposition 6. 
Proof: ( Proposition 7) Again, use the central planner's formulation of the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. First, determine E[a lz ;  z-1  ( . , · ) ] ,  where Z ( . , · ) is given in lemma .5 ( which
continues to hold for !VI�) .  A tedious change-of-variables from ( O", w) to ( O", z ) usiug
z = Z(O", w ) provides ( assuming v2 < �) : 
1 
f(O", z )  = ---------------� l {z<Oj ( z  + av2 ) + l {zE[0,1-av' ) }av2 + l { z:'.'.1 -nn' I (  l - z )  
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Consequently, 
E[o- l z :  z- 1( · •  · )] 
l ' 1 
[ 2 -au- + -z .  (z E -av , 0 ) ) ,
2 2 
1 
2 [ 2 2av + z, (z E 0, 1 - av ) ) ,
1 1 
2 J z + 2z, (z E [1 - av , 1 ) .
The first-order conditions of the incentive compatibility condition can. as befme. be 
written as an ordinary differential equation: 
-av2y'y + y'(Jo + zh1 - 1 ) )  + -Y1 Y = 0,
where -y0, 'Ii take on values depending on z. The second-order conditions are:
2-yiy' (z) - av2(. y'( z ) )2 + ho + z(J1 - 1 )  - av2y(z) )y"( z ) < 0. 
(i) For z E [O, 1 - au2) ,  -y0 = 1av2 and -y1 = 1. The ordinary different ial equatiou that 
represents the first-order condition is separable. and the solution is giveu bv: 
1 ? I 2 2a1dnly - av y + z + k = 0,
for constants k, where k is determined by the criterion function of the central
planner's problem. The second-order conditions are satisfied for y'( :: )  < 0. 1 .e . •
y E (0 , 1 J .  
(ii) For z E [-av2, 0) , 'lo = �av2 and -y1 = � · The first-order conditions become:
-2av2y'y + y'(av2 - z) + y = 0.
This ordinary differential equation is  not separable, and needs to be solved numer­
ically. The second-order conditions are satisfied for y'(z) < 0. i .e . .  y < 1 (  l - .,:, ) . 
(iii) For z E [1 - av2 , l j , -y0 = 11 = 1 · the first-order conditions become:
2 I I -2av y y + y ( 1  - z ) + y = 0,
again a nonseparable differential equation. The second-order conditions are satisfied 
for y'(z) < 0, i .e . ,  y < ;a-v� · 
Next, set µ(a-, z) = 5-av' ( z )  in the central planner's criterion function. The member of 
the family of solutions to the above ordinary differential equations that maximizes the 
resulting central planner's criterion function will be anchored at { z, y( z ) }  = { -av2 •  1 - E }  
for some small number E > 0 .  ( At y(-av2) = 1 ,  the corresponding second-order con­
ditions are violated. ) Consequently, the "worst type" , i .e . ,  the insider with z = -av2
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(a = 0, w = 1 ) , will be almost fully insured. k ,  the constant of integration in the so­
lution for z E [O, 1 - av2) will be determined so the solution for z E [-av1• Oj 1rn1Lches 
up at z = 0. Similarly, the solution for z E [l - av2, l] should match up with that for
z E [O, 1 - av2)  at z = 1 - av2• Figure 1 displays equilibria for various values of au 2 .  We 
have checked the numerical solutions against the second-order conditions. y'( z )  < 0. for 
various va.lues of av2; they were never violated for initial values ( z ,  y (  z ) ) = ( -au1. 1 - t ) .
• 
Proof: ( Proposition 6 )  Take z E [O, 1 - av2 ) .  The linear solution to the ordinarv dif­
ferential equation that represents the first-order conditions of the incentive compatibility 
constraint has slope: a�' , which is  greater than zero, viola.ting the second-order comli-
tious. • 
Proof: (Proposition 8) Replicating the proof of proposition I .  we obtain the folloll' ing:
�av2 + �z, (z E [-av2, - ( 1 - 6 )av2 ) ) ,
2 2 
= ( 1  - � )av2 + z, ( z  E [ -( 1  - 6 )av2• I - m·2 ) ) .
2 
� + � ( l - 8)av2 + � z, ( z E [l - av2 1 - ( l - b )ac2 ) ) .
2 2 2 
( i )  For z E [-av2• - (  1 - 6 )av2) ,  the solution is identical to the one of proposition 1 . 
except for the shorter support. 
( i i )  For z E [- ( 1  - 6 )av2, 1 - av2) ,  the solution becomes:
The second-order conditions ( y' (z )  < 0) are satisfied for y E (0, l - � ] .  
(iii) For z E [1 - av2, 1 - ( 1  - 6 )av2] , the ordinary differential equation that represents
the first-order conditions of the incentive compatibility condition becomes: 
2av2y'y - y'( 1 + ( 1 - 6)av2) + zy' - y = 0.
This equation needs to be solved numerically. The second-order condition. y' ( ::: ) < 
0, is satisfied for 
1 + (1 - 6)av2 - z 
y < �������-
2av2 
Setting µ(a, z )  = .s·_a,2 ( z ) , the same optimal supply schedule an [-av2 .  - ( 1  - 6 )1w2) as
before with 6 = l is obtained. I t  is anchored at ( z , y ( z ) )  = ( -av2, 1 - t ) , for some small
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E > 0. The optimal schedules for z E [-av2, - (  1 - 5 )av2) and z E [ 1 - av2 ,  1 - ( l - b )ac1)
are matched with the one for z E [ - ( 1  - 5 )av2, 1 - av2 ) .  Figure 2 displays the opt imal
supply schedules on [-av2, 1 - ( 1 - 8 )av2) for various values of 5. ln all cases. t he 
second-order conditions are satisfied. 
As 5 l 0, the first interval, [-av2, - (  l - 8 )cw2 ) ,  vanishes. The solution on [- (  1 -b )ar2• l -
av2 ) converges to tha.t of proposition 3 .  The last interval, z E [ l  - av2• 1 - ( l - 6 )av2)
also vanishes. Ill 
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Figure 1 :  Quantity ( Y )  a.s a function of the market maker's imperfect information ( Z )
wheu av2 = .9 .
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Figure 2: Quantity ( Y )  as a function of the market maker's imperfect inforrnaliou ( /'.' )  
when av2 = . 9  and the amount of noise approaches zero ( .5  = [ ! .  . 7.5 . . 2:) , O] ) .
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